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sin__lust@2004-05-09 18:39
用户被禁言,该主题自动屏蔽!
sin__lust@2004-05-09 18:42
用户被禁言,该主题自动屏蔽!
enoca@2004-05-09 18:53
引用
最初由 fifman 发布
我想在这里做一个对自由的总结发言。
何谓自由？
我知道这个问题太空泛，太无厘头，太突兀。可是，自由绝非像enoca同学刚刚说的那样鄙薄。如果要给自由本身下一个准确的定义，那是干不来的。因为它是一个概念，是一种理想，是一个目标。
省略....
我很多次看到，有人鼓吹所谓“战争无对错，只是不理解”的腔调；也很多次看到，许多无病呻吟还自以为高深的感慨。对此我也不想多说什么，只是，当连道德观念中最基本的一些东西都开始否定和质疑时，那就让人不由得不反感了。所以当看到enoca那句话时，不由得过敏。
恩............
说得很不错.........
FIF看看你以前的帖子,你现在真是变化由内而外么...
(当然你大概不认为这是好事....)
自由是什么?
是应该扪心自问的东西
是当自己对此一时语塞的时候
应该反思的东西
此乃御风而行的哲思....
(哈...终于升华了...)
为什么要对某些东西报有疑问..那并不代表全是怀疑,质疑
对自己的信念有更深的了解,这才会更加明确.
一个信仰自由的战士--------如果连自己信仰的东西都弄得含糊不情
那不是很可笑么?
wondy@2004-05-09 19:13
引用
最初由 fifman 发布
我想在这里做一个对自由的总结发言。
何谓自由？
我知道这个问题太空泛，太无厘头，太突兀。可是，自由绝非像enoca同学刚刚说的那样鄙薄。如果要给自由本身下一个准确的定义，那是干不来的。因为它是一个概念，是一种理想，是一个目标。
然而，这并不等于超越时空、不以人类本身意志为转移的“自由”概念是不存在的。它就像是老子的“道”，是组成这个世界的法则之一，是无法触摸到、清楚地明白但是却能够了解它在何处以及前进的方向的一种东西——
秦始皇时代，反抗暴政就是自由！
林肯时代，废除奴隶制就是自由！
旧社会时代，推翻三座大山就是自由！
“王侯将相宁有种乎”的呼声，“不自由，毋宁死”的宣言，这就是“自由”在各个不同时代、不同环境下产生的具体意义不同的光辉体现！
所以谁也无法说自由是什么以及能够达到多大的自由度——这是受当时环境的约束的。然而，难道就可以说自由是不存在的么？以上的那些人，那些事，都成了无意义的么？诚然，很多人后来都变了，可是他们当时所作的事，也随着他们后来的变质而变得一文不值了么？
显然不是！
像所谓的“自由到底是什么”的质疑，看似很发人深省，很有意义，其实是所谓的无病呻吟。人必须相信才能活下去，必须给你一个支点，你才能撬动地球。如果想连你所依靠的支点都怀疑，都否定，那么你便只有朝着毁灭的深渊挺进。这个支点，便是由你本身建立的道德观和正义感。
不错不错，鼓掌！FIF你终于给这贴增添了一个亮点~~~
虽然说不存在绝对的自由或者终极的自由，但是自由也并非虚无缥缈的存在，不同的历史环境下，自由有它的具体表现，能够被当时的众多人们所坚定的追求着。“一种理想，一个目标。”说得好，自由正是这样一种东西，你可以对它存有疑问，但是不要轻易的否定它，因为你否定的，很可能是其他人心中不容动摇的支点所在。
对于日漫，我还是老话：自己动脑多想想，别太当真了。
lslwyw@2004-05-09 19:28
需要在特定背景特定表现的自由是建立在秩序基础上的有限的自由，虽然自己并不认为这东西有多神圣，但是并不否定别人信奉这个
我也来跑题了…………你们继续，我还是板凳把，表轰我，轰我必回
jsmxiang@2004-05-09 19:39
不吵不吵，有一美让人发现就好，至少可以看到一点鲜艳的动人的东西。至于百丑之说，见解不同，不喜欢大可无视之～
也是青菜萝卜各有所爱的问题啦～～
wbcan@2004-05-09 19:46
引用
最初由 fifman 发布
我和你说的意思不一样。统治阶级有着最大的自由是不错。可是当其有进步转为退步时，相对的广大的被统治阶级越来越失去自由。自由不是某一人的特定所有物，我这里说的，是“自由平等”里的那种精神。当统治阶级变为压迫者后，他们就失去了这一精神。历史是什么时候都不会抛弃自由精神的。
你说的是权力吧，不给别人自由的权利那叫什么自由？叫霸权。
最后一句话唯心了些，中国什么时候才有自由这概念的？
自由和权利是分不开的，你向我挥拳头的自由受到不得接近我下巴距离多少的限制，这是美国最高法官对宪法中自由的形象诠释。
arisa@2004-05-09 20:01
引用
最初由 wbcan 发布
最后一句话唯心了些，中国什么时候才有自由这概念的？
原来在牛顿发现地心引力之前苹果是往上飞的
堕落@2004-05-09 20:28
自由........... 天赋人权......
近来被老师逼翻译了一段文字，有兴趣者可以一阅（和本主题无关）
（我自己翻译的，当中很多很多错误，总之大致能看懂就好）
Natural Rights Don't Exist
By Jonathan Wallace
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, which among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
So wrote Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. We were taught in school that these words are beautiful, but today I regard them as dishonest or lazy, depending on whether or not Jefferson was aware of the problem with them.
If you and I are arguing about something and I reply, "It is obvious that I am right," I have added nothing to our dialog. I may as well have said, "I declare victory." If Jefferson--so often a golden-tongued hypocrite--was not consciously engaging in a debater's trick, he was taking an intellectual short-cut, using a tautology: "It is true because....it is true."
How can there be "self-evident" rights? Jefferson was writing under a British system which did not recognize the rights that he described, and which was the legal government of the colonies until they succeeded in separating themselves and forming a new one. Had Jefferson written, "We want the following rights," he would have been making a simple, clear statement easy to understand. Language allows us to construct phrases which are grammatically correct but which do not mean anything (or do not mean what they appear to). Does the statement "We hold these rights to be self-evident" in fact mean anything more profound than "we want them?"
Jefferson's and the other framers' views on natural rights were derived from John Locke's highly influential Second Treatise of Government, first published anonymously in 1690. In Chapter 2, "Of the state of nature", Locke describes the "state of nature" in which men exist before forming governments:
...A state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit, within the bounds of the laws of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection....
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions....
Permit me an "aha!" Is not this prose exactly the kind Hume was thinking of in his famous condemnation of deriving an "ought" from an "is"?
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulation of propositions is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason ought to be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it.
Now note what Locke did: In the state of nature, "all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal" and therefore all men "should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection...."
And he does it again: "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it" which teaches that "no one ought to harm another".
Locke's view of the state of nature is more placid than that of Thomas Hobbes, who believed that all men begin in a state of war of "every man, against every man." Locke by contrast could imagine men living together "according to reason", that is, peacefully, "but without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them" (Chapter 3, "Of the state of war").
OK, let us watch Hobbes conjugate “An Ought From An Is”.
To this ware of every man against every man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have there no place.
Seeming to say that there are no natural rights, just a state of chaos before government. In the state of nature, "Force and Fraud" are the two cardinal virtues; "there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thin distinct."
But then we make the rough transition to Chapter 14, "Of the first and second Natural Law’s, and of Contracts":
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Natural, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgment, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto.
"Rights" language, as these two philosophers illustrate, is among the trickiest of human concepts: it is an area in which we all think we know what we are talking about when in reality we have no idea. Hobbes starts by saying that in a state of nature, there is no Justice, no property, etc., therefore no possible founding of "rights"; but in his next chapter he appears to say that without human rulebooks (criminal laws, laws of property) we each should have the right to do whatever preserves our life and our enjoyment.
Hobbes (and many others) seems to me to confound three concepts: what we physically can do; what we desire, which may be different; and what we ought to do, which again may be entirely distinct from the first two categories.
Looked at this way, Locke and Hobbes commit very different versions of Hume's fallacy. Locke reverse engineers the way things are from the way he believes they ought to be: people should be peaceful and respectful of one another, and therefore are this way in a state of nature, which exists only because they lack a common judge. Hobbes goes in the other direction and elevates the way he believes things are (nasty and brutish, constant war of all against all) to a moral imperative, that we (ought to) have a right of mutual destruction until we adopt rules which say otherwise.
What we physically can do
This seems to me to be the single most dangerous foundation for a claimed "right", as we have the physical ability to do all the things we make rules against (there would be no point in banning them if we couldn't do them.)
If we regard rights as a human-generated rulebook, not engraven in the fabric of the universe, we can analyze many circumstances in which the rule-makers must mediate between conflicting interpretations. For example, our courts answer questions like the following every day: Does your right of free speech trump my right of privacy? In this scheme of things, rights are a binary switch, and the rule-makers simply decide which way to set the switch. If you have a right to do something, I have an obligation to respect it and not to interfere with it. It would be illogical to say you have a "right" to do something which I have a "right" to prevent.
But this is exactly the case in the Hobbesian state of nature. I have a "right" to kill you if you get in my way, but you have an equal "right" to kill me. If I am stronger and I succeed, your family nonetheless has a "right" to take revenge, and so forth. ("An eye for an eye," said Gandhi, "makes the whole world blind.")
But if we think strictly in terms of language, what do we add by speaking of "rights" in this context? When we are speaking of human rulebooks, it is much easier to answer that question. A right can be defined as a rule which protects you in taking an action and prevents me from interfering with it.
But in a Hobbesian state of nature, the word "right" seems to be stripped of any content not already contained in the word "can". Compare these two statements:
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I can kill you.
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I have a right to kill you.
There is no meaning communicated by the second statement not already contained in the first. But there appears to be. I have written elsewhere that the word God is often used as a semantic stop sign, meaning simultaneously "Stop asking questions" and "I have won this argument." The word "right" is used similarly. People frequently use it in a context where it has no other possible meaning, like a child at the dinner table proclaiming angrily "I have a right to speak!"
I have a pet cockatiel named Chandler, who lives in a cage and eats a seed and pellet mixture. I let him out of his cage for about an hour a day. Does it make any sense to you, if instead of saying that Chandler eats seeds, I say "Chandler has a right to seeds"? Does he have a "right" to his cage, or to be let out of it? If "Chandler has a right to seeds" has no more meaning than the statement "Chandler eats seeds", why does "man has a right to self defense" mean anything more than "men defend themselves"? The answer can only be in a tautology, a prejudgment of our conclusion: that there is something special about man which dictates that natural rights exist (essentially because we want them to.)
This is why rights language is not only fuzzy but dangerous; for many of us the word "rights" communicates an imprimatur of moral authority, causing us to behave respectfully even in contexts where it is completely meaningless. Like an automobile, we should never buy a right until we have looked beneath the hood.
In Language, Truth and Logic, Alfred Ayers concurs that not only rights language but that of morality in general communicates far less than it purports to:
Fundamental ethical conceptions are unanalyzable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgments in which they occur...They are mere pseudo concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a particular tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks.
In a debate with gun rights people year before last, I rapidly discovered that they all believed that the right to bear arms was a natural right, engraved in the fabric of the universe, and merely affirmed, not created by their beloved Second Amendment. For these people, Locke and Hobbes are living philosophers (and more particularly Hobbes, I think.)
The concept of natural rights was used by many of my gun rights correspondents both as a club and a credit card on which to charge up selfishness. Club: "I have a natural right to self defense, so therefore I win this argument," was the gist of many of the messages I received. Credit card: When I proposed that we sit at a table together to make a rulebook about guns, accommodating the interests of those who do not want them along with those who do, many people responded: "My natural right to bear arms trumps your desire not to have guns around. Therefore there is no basis for discussion."
You hear in such debates not only that it is "natural" for us to defend ourselves but that animals are equipped with claws, horns and teeth to do so. Somehow this fact, that people and other animals defend themselves when endangered, is extrapolated into a "right."
Twenty years ago, I watched fascinated in a park in Athens as a male tortoise encountered a female. He rushed at her, biting at her neck and forelegs, while she desperately tried to escape. Finally, she gave up and withdrew her head and limbs into her shell, and he mounted her from behind. Five years ago (the month the first issue of the Spectacle was published) I stood on a beach in the Galapagos and watched female sea turtles congregating in the shallow water. A biologist explained that the females enter the shallow water during mating season to escape the males who are unable to force themselves on them if the water is not deep enough. It seems general that in many turtle species the females derive no pleasure from copulation and do everything they can to avoid it. The actions of the males if performed by humans would be characterized as rape.
Rape is physically possible; if we derive natural rights from anything which can be done in a state of nature we could just as easily say there is a right of rape as to claim there is one of self-defense. Yet in our society we lock up anyone who acts on this belief. But I challenge anyone who believes there is a natural right of self defense to explain to me why there is no right of rape.
Here is the answer: We believe there is a natural right to do anything which we think should be permitted (or mandated) under a human rulebook. Anything which should be forbidden under a human rulebook therefore cannot be a natural right, even if it is physically possible and can be justified by the same arguments used to support the idea of natural rights.
What we desire
This is just another way of saying that we like to believe that our desires are greater than ourselves; that what we want is necessary, that there is no choice, that the universe has dictated that we must pursue it.
One of the functions of our legal system is to analyze acts of violence to determine whether they involved acceptable acts of self defense ("justifiable homicide"). If a man attacks me with a knife and I shoot him in reasonable fear of my life, I will not be held legally responsible. But there is a chasm between the reality of self-defense, which involves a legally acceptable choice to kill rather than die, and the familiar statement, "I had no choice. It was him or me."
Like natural rights, the concept of necessity is used as a debaters' trick, to win arguments before they have begun. If it was "necessary" to kill the man who attacked me with the knife, is it similarly "necessary" for me to kill and eat the other denizen of a lifeboat? After all, if I do not, I will die, so in that sense it is either "him or me".
Note the similarity to the natural rights discussion? In a state of nature, I can kill and eat the other passenger; I want to, because I desire to survive; and therefore I should have a "natural right" to do so.
What we ought to do
While deriving "rights" from physically possible acts or our own desires shortcuts moral debate and human freedom, projecting our own rulebooks onto the universe is equally insidious (and usually more subtly expressed than the crude language used by proponents of these other beliefs.)
Let’s look at Locke again:
Reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions....
While I would not allow Hobbes to guide me down a blind alley, because of my distrust of his ideas, Locke could easily get me in all kinds of trouble, because he wants what I want: peace among humans. But he has committed the same fallacy as the more brutal Hobbes. A Hobbesian says, I want your property, therefore I have a right to it; but a Locke says I want peace; therefore we all have a right to it.
The theme of three thousand years of human moral discourse has been the attempt to plant moral rules on some firmer foundation than our own freedom. God, Jesus, Platonic forms, pure reason, categorical imperatives, and genetic rewards for altruism, all come to the same thing: the fear and loneliness inspired by human freedom.
One of the more interesting things you learn about in law school is the evolution of human custom into law. Codes based on custom and practice, like the Uniform Commercial Code, tend to sparkle with common sense, and are easy to apply. I ship you goods "freight on board": they are my legal responsibility until they are on board your ship. I send them "cost, insurance, freight": they are your responsibility from the moment I accept your order.
Now imagine the spectacle of an assembly of businessmen and lawyers, tasked with creating a uniform commercial code, trying to derive their rules from the behavior of lions or bears or of humans in a state of nature. Even if they were trying to base their legislation on the old and new Testaments they would find these "precedents" to be of partial help, and rather contradictory. Instead, we all acknowledge that the act of legislating is (and should be) an exercise of determining the rules we want and which make sense from a practical standpoint.
Next, imagine the even stranger spectacle of this assembly weeping and wailing, and abandoning its work, because it has determined that there is no natural rule-set, engraved in the universe's fabric, to determine who has the responsibility for freight which is destroyed between the warehouse and the boat.
Freedom
The natural rights debate leads us down a false road. The energy spent in arguing which rules exist should better be spent deciding which rules we should make. The "perfect freedom" Locke described "to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit... without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man", does not dictate the existence of rights; instead it leaves us perfectly free to legislate them.
I prefer this freedom, which seems to me simple and clear: we are all at a table together, deciding which rules to adopt, free from any vague constraints, half-remembered myths, anonymous patriarchal texts and murky concepts of nature. If I propose something you do not like, tell me why it is not practical, or harms somebody, or is counter to some other useful rule; but don't tell me it offends the universe.
Yeats said:
Locke fell into a swoon;
The Garden died;
God took the spinning jenny out of His side.
堕落@2004-05-09 20:32
这是翻译
汗 刚才忘帖出来了
天赋人权并不存在
By乔纳森•华莱士
我们认为真理是不言而喻的，所有的人类被创造时都是平等的，他们被他们的创造者赐予了一些不能被剥夺的权利，包括生存的权利，追求自由和愉快的权利。
托马斯•杰斐逊在独立宣言里这样写到。我们在学校接受教育的时候也认为这些都是美好的，但是今天我认为这些是虚伪或者懒散的，当然这取决于杰斐逊是否也认识到了这个问题。
如果你和我就此事进行争论的话，我可以答到：“显然我是正确的，”我已经没有必要再补充任何东西了。也许还是我直接说，“我宣布我胜利了。”来的好。如果杰斐逊——这个能言善辩的伪君子——他并不是有意识的运用辩论者的诡计，而是采用一种非常聪明的捷径，用重复的方式来证明：“因为...是真的，所以它是真的。”
为什么会有“不言而喻的”权利？杰斐逊在那种并没有像他所形容的意识到权利的英国系统下进行写作，在他们成功分离并组成一个新的组织之前，这一直是这个殖民地的法制部门。杰斐逊之前写过，“我们需要以下一些权利，”他可能已经陈述了一个简单、清晰评论使得我们非常容易理解。语言允许我们去创造一种短语。
自然的状况有一条自然的规则去约束每个人，告诫了所有人都要遵守那一点，即所有的人类都是平等和独立的，没有人可以危害另一个人的生命，健康，自由或者财产....
允许我笑一下，这种说法是否正是慈祥的休姆所想的关于他著名的对那个“Deriving An Ought From An Is”的谴责？
在每个我至今遇到的道德理论体系中，我总是注意到作者有时按普通的推理方式进行， 并且建立一个神的存在，或者做关于人类事件的评论；突然我吃惊地发现，与一般主张的“是与不是”不同的是，我遇到不是与是否应该相联系的。这个变化并不容易察觉，但是，不管怎样，最后结果的确如此。由于应该或者不应该明确或肯定了一些新的关系，它是有必要被观察并且解释的；并且与此同时应当给出一个原因来解释那些难以想象的东西，既是说这新的关系究竟该怎样被其他完全不同的关系演绎。
现在注意以下洛克做的：在本性的状态下，“全部能力和审判权相互的” 因此所有人“应该是没有从属和顺从的平等的人”。
而且他一再强调说：“天赋人权由法律给予支持”，意思是说“没有人可以伤害另一个人”。
洛克的对自然本性形态的观点比托马斯•霍布斯的温和，他相信所有人在战争状态内开始的“每一个人都和其他人相互敌对。”洛克对比“依照这个原因”想象人一起生活，即和平地共存，“但究竟不是用普通的地位而是用权威去判断他们。”(《战争的状态》，第三章 )。
OK，让我们看看霍布斯列举的那个“Deriving An Ought From An Is”（自由不是应该有，而是更本就存在）
对于人与人敌对，这也是随之而来的，没有什么可能是不公正的。正确与错误，公正和不公平的观念，没有分别。
好像说在统治以前没有自然的权利，只不过的一种混乱状态。 在一种本性的状态，“强制和欺诈”是两种主要美德：“没有正当，没有主权，没有我的和你的之分。”好像说在政府以前没有天赋人权，只不过的一种混乱的状态。
然而我们做了对第14 章的粗略的转变，“从第一和第二自然法的和契约的角度”：
自然的权利，作者们通常称为 Jus Natural ，是每个人拥有的自由，运用他自己的权利，由自己来支配自己，以维持其本性；即，属于自己的生命；并且，做任何事情，以其自己的判断和理由，他应构思出最适宜的方法去处理。
“权利”语言，正如这两位哲学家所说明的，是人类的思想中最微妙的部分：这一部分是当在现实中我们不知道该怎么办时我们知道正谈论些什么。
霍布斯提出，处在自然状态，没有正义，没有财产，等等，因此权利没有建立的可能； 但是在他的下一章里他似乎是说没有人类规则的书 ( 刑法，关于财产的法律 ) 我们每个人都有权去做那些保护我们自己生命和我们的欢乐的任何事情。
霍布斯 ( 和很多其它人 ) 似乎混淆了三个概念：我们自身能做的是什么；我们想要的是什么，可能存在什么不同；和我们应该做什么，第二次与第一次可能是完全不同的这两个范畴。
以这种方法看，洛克和霍布斯对人类的谬误演绎了两个非常不同的版本。洛克以其认为理所应当的方式颠倒了设计者所设计的事物的方式：人们应该和平相处并互相尊重，并且这种方式是自然的状态，这种存在仅仅因为缺乏公众的法官。霍布斯走向另一个方向并且提出这样的方式，他认为事物是走向一种道德规则的 ( 肮脏和粗暴，无休止的战争和反抗) ，我们 ( 应该 ) 有相互破坏的权利直到我们采用了另外内容的规章。
我们自身可以做的
这对我来说，是对主张的所谓“权利”一项最危险的基础，如若我们能制定相关禁令，这也意味着我们同样拥有做到任何禁令所限制的事项的能力。
如果我们把权利视为是人类与生俱来的规则手册，而非一纸空文，我们就可以分析那些立法者为调节各种冲突规则而必然所处的环境。例如，每天法院回复诸如此类的问题：是否你的言论自由权高于我的隐私权？这些问题的配置中，权利是可以二元式转化的，立法者可以轻易地决定其转化的方向。
如果你有为一定行为的权利，那么我就义务去尊重你的权利而不去干扰它的行使。认为有权为他人有权阻止的事项，这样的说法是不合逻辑的。但是，这却是霍布斯哲学关于自然状态的真实案例。
当你阻挡了我的去路，我就有权杀你，你也有同等的权利来杀我。如果我变得更强大而取得了胜利，对你的家族也有权进行报复，等等……
但是假如严格地按照字面理解，该如何在下文对“权利”进行补充？当我们提及人类的规则手册时，这个问题也就迎刃而解。权利往往可以被定义为，是一项保护你行使特定行为，或者说防止行使权利的过程中受到阻碍的规则。
在霍布斯看来，“权利”一词是不为任何“可以”“能够”所能包涵的内容所剥夺的。试比较以下两种情况：
在霍布斯（Hobbes）的天赋人权观点中，我可以杀死你。
在霍布斯（Hobbes）的天赋人权观点中，我有权利杀死你。
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I can kill you.
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I have a right to kill you.
一般第二种说法不会有别的意思，除了第一种说法已经有的。但对我来说，好像并非如此。我在别处写下上帝时,常被用作语义停止的符号,意思跟“停止问问题”和“我已经赢了争辩”相似。“权利”这个词也类似。人们经常用到它，在没有可能有别的意思的时候，就像一个小孩在餐桌上愤怒的宣布：“我有权利说话”。
我有一只宠物，是一只名字叫“Chandler”的鹦鹉。它生活在笼子中并且吃的是种子和小球的混合物。我每天让它出笼子一个小时。除了“Chandler”吃种子这种说法，难道这会让你认为，我因此可以说：“Chandler有对种子的一种权利？”或者它有对笼子的权力？或者有出去的权力吗？为什么“人们有自我防卫的权力”可以有比“人们防卫自己”更多的任何意思呢？答案只能是：对我们自己结论的一种重复和预断，也就是关于人类的一种特有的东西，这东西便是：天赋人权（本质上我们想拥有这种东西）。
这就是为什么这种权利含义不仅有趣而且危险：对我们中的许多人来说，“权力”和一种道德上权威的许可相联系，使我们对它表现出一定的推崇，即使是毫无疑义的境况下。就像一辆汽车，我们不会去买它的权利，直到我们看到它停在车棚下。
在语言表达、事实和逻辑上，阿尔弗雷德•艾尔斯不仅赞成权利这种说法，也赞成在平常交往中，遵从远远比权利赋予我们更少的道德上的因素。
伦理道德的基本概念是无法分析的，因为当他发生时，并没有一个标准可以判断其正确性。他们只是一些假冒的概念。伦理象征的存在也没有什么现实的意义。因此，如果我对某人说：“你偷钱是不对的”，我还不如简单地说：“你偷钱了。”我没有更深入地说明为什么这种行为是不对的，而只是简单地表明自己对此在道德标准上的否定。这与我用一种诧异的口吻说“你偷了钱！”，或者写下来，再加上一串特别的惊叹号，是没有区别的。
在前年关于持枪权的辩论中，我很快发现，人们都相信拥有武器是深深烙刻在大千世界的结构中，并且赋予我们的一种自然权利，第二修正案的诞生仅仅是更加确定了这种权利，而不是创造了它。
自然权利这个概念被许多报道持枪权的记者们使用，他们将它用做满足他们自己利益的俱乐部和信用卡。俱乐部说：“我有自然权利保护自己，所以我赢得这场争论，”这正是我得到的许多信息的要点。信用卡说：“我提议我们坐下来制定一个持枪法规，以调解持有相反观点的人。”此时许多人的反映是：“我的否定观点要胜过你合法持枪的观点。因此这里没有争论的基础。”
在这场辩论中，你所听到的不仅是我们有这种“天赋”权利来保护我们自己，并且在说动物有爪子，角和牙齿进行自我保护。但无论如何这是事实，人和动物都会在身陷危机的时候保护自己，进而推知，这就是一种“权利”。
20年前，我在雅典的一个公园里看见了一件非常奇怪的事，一只公龟遇见了一只母龟。他朝她冲了过去，咬她的脖子和前腿，而那只母龟拼命的想逃脱。不过，最后她还是放弃了，把自己的头和四肢都缩进了壳里，公龟骑在了她身上。五年前（关于这个场面的第一篇文章发表的同一个月）,我站在Galapagos群岛的海滩上看着那些聚集在浅水里的雌海龟。生物学家解释说母海龟在合适的季节里躲到浅水里，因为公海龟只有在深水里才能爬到她们的背上。通常很多种类的母海龟并不能从交配中得到乐趣，所以她们尽量去避免交配。这样，那些公海龟的行为表现为人类的活动就是强奸。
强奸在生理上是可行的，如果我们在自然状态下能获得做任何事的权利，我们就可以简单的认为就像我们有自卫的权利一样我们也有强奸的权利。然而，在我们的社会里我们却禁止这种观念的产生。但是我向每一个相信可以用人的自卫权力来解释我们应该有强奸权力的人进行挑战！
这里给出了答案：我们认为我们有天生做被允许做在人类社会的规则下可以做的任何事的权利。因此，在人类社会的规则下被禁止做的任何事不能成为一种天生的权利，即使这种事从人类自身来说是可行的，或者可以用支持人类天生权力的相同的言论来辩驳的！
我们都乐意相信，我们的愿望比我们自己更加重要，换句话说，我们想要的就是必要的，我们没有选择，我们天生注定要有所追求。
法律制度的其中一个职责就是对暴力行为进行分析，判断是否存在正当防卫（即有理由的凶杀）。
如果有人拿刀子袭击我，我出于自我保护而捅了他，我将不必为此负任何法律责任。
但是，当牵涉到一个合法化的选择，就是宁愿杀人也不愿意送死，名曰自我防卫，这和我们常常听到的声辩的声音：“我别无选择，不是他死就是我亡！”还是存在着分歧的。
与自然权力一样，人的必然需要也成了辩论者的有力藉口，使他们在辩论还没开始前，就获得了胜利。如果有必要把那个企图拿刀子杀我的人杀死，是不是也有必要杀死或者吃掉救生艇上的幸存者呢？毕竟，若我不这么做的话，死的人将是我，这样说来，就是“不是他死就是我亡”。
我们应该做的
从身体上可能的行为或我们自己需求短期道德辩论和自由权角度引发的权利，突出表现我们个人规则在世界万物之上同样是阴险的（通常比其他信念的支持者所用的拙劣的语言能够更加敏锐的表达出来）
让我们再次看看洛克的观点：
理由, 是教会了所有人考虑那所有的人都是平等和独立的,没有人可以伤害他人的生命，健康，自由或财产....
因为对他想法的不信任，所以我不允许霍布斯（Hobbes）引着我走进一条死胡同。洛克（Locke）总是给我带来各种麻烦，因为我想要的他也要： 人类的和平。 但是他已经持有与更野蛮的霍布斯相同的谬见。一位霍布斯派哲学家说，我想要你的财产，因此我对它有一种权利； 但是洛克派哲学家说，我想要和平，因此我们所有人都有权利。
3000年来，人类道德演说的主题已经成为一种尝试，尝试在比我们自由更为坚固的基础上建立道德准则。上帝，耶稣，柏拉图的形式，纯原因，利他主义的起源，都说明了一件事情：被人类自由所激起的恐惧与孤独。
你在法律学校中了解到的比较有趣的一件事情就是将人类的习俗演变成法律的过程。基于习俗与惯例的法典，比如《统一商法典》（the Uniform Commercial Code），势必会与常识产生火花，并且易于适用。我用"freight on board"（FOB）的方式载运你的货物：在货物上你的船之前，我对他们负有法律责任。我用"cost, insurance, freight"（CIF）的方式来载运你的货物：自我接受你的订货开始，你就要对他们负有全责。
试想一个商人和律师的会面的景象，任务是让他们来制定一个《统一商法典》（the Uniform Commercial Code），试图从狮子、熊或者在自然状态下的人的行为中找出规律。即使他们试图在旧的和新的遗嘱上来建立他们的立法，他们将发现这些“先例”只能起一部分的帮助，甚至还帮倒忙。我们都承认立法的行为是决定我们想要的规律前的演习，而这也正从现实的观点出发而更有意义。
接着，试想一幅更为奇怪的景象：哭泣和嚎叫。抛开他的职责不说，因为它决定了这里没有天生的规律，并不存在于宇宙的结构之中。要是货物在仓库和船之间被破坏了，那由它来决定谁对货物负有责任。
自由
天赋人权的争论把我们引向了一条错误的道路。与其把精力用在争论我们应当让哪一些规则继续存在下去，还不如把精力用在决定制订哪一些准则。洛克（Locke）所描述的“完美的自由”是“给他们行动下达指示，卖掉他们财产，当他们看见适合的人...不用请示离开或者依赖任何其它人的意愿”，并没有强制规定权利的存在；而也给我们足够的自由来立法。
我比较喜欢这种自由，它看起来单纯而且清楚：我们其实都在一条船上，决定采用哪个规则，摆脱那些模糊约束，依稀记得的神话故事，匿名的教条式文章和晦暗的自然概念。如果我提出的某些建议你不喜欢，请告诉我为什么它是不实际的，或者伤害了某些人，或者和一些其它有用的规则相抵触；但是别和我说它违反了宇宙规律。
耶茨(爱尔兰诗人及剧作家, 曾获1923年诺贝尔文学奖)说：
洛克陷入了晕睡中；
在花园里死了；
上帝从他的身边拿走了的纺纱机。
堕落@2004-05-09 20:35
其实我的主要目的是想这里是否有人愿意帮我找出翻译的错误
实在太难翻译了...
ownfish@2004-05-09 20:40
我看着都累……难为你翻译……先存下来，明天再慢慢看，现在得准备明天上学了……
堕落@2004-05-09 20:50
先感激的说
哎
如果星界不是日本人的作品就好了.....
fifman@2004-05-09 21:39
引用
最初由 diablo12 发布
我想就算是在星界的世界里,亚布治下的星球也可能和我一样不喜欢亚布的统治方式,当矛盾激化,暴力升级,那亚布如何处理呢?这是一个悖论,无论其采取和平的还是暴力的手段(事实上,亚布大部分实行的都是暴力压迫式统治),相信对他的完美的制度都是一种反动.
在这个问题上星界采取的是一种“想当然”、“顺理成章”的应对手法。首先，由于人类统合体和亚布对待人类价值观的两种不同的态度，导致地上人倾向亚布。然后，由于是以拉斐尔和津特为视角，使得书中得以避免了很多一旦面对就难以自圆其说的问题。例如倘若地上人反抗，亚布会如何镇压等手法，还有当初扩张领土时遇到抵抗会如何（如果说一次抵抗都没有，那也太扯了。）这些由于是站在拉斐尔和津特的视角来看，所以没有必要描述。
不过根据参考，拉斐尔打算镇压那个监狱行星时所列举的那种令人不寒而栗的手法，估计好不到哪去……我不认为拉斐尔是随口说说，她不是会在对方代表面前开玩笑的人。如果你说这是因为拉斐尔不知道地上人的生存条件、欠缺有关地上生活的知识，那就说明了军官学校没有教这些东西，也说明了地上人的人权和生存权在亚布心中是多么没有价值。因为，作为一个打算征服、要与之打交道的对手，居然连这种基本知识都不考虑？
diablo12@2004-05-09 21:41
引用
最初由 堕落 发布
先感激的说
哎
如果星界不是日本人的作品就好了.....
如果星界是中国的作品,我会说书中存在深厚的封建思想残余^^^^^
笑^^^^^^^^^^^其实亚洲人对民主的理解确实是同西方人不同的,文化背景决定了很多东西.
偶以为,在东方,真正理解西方民主,自由概念的一个也没有,因为我们的文化决定了,骨子里的那一套封建思想不是一百年时间清除的了的.
关于星界,只想说,有什么意见提什么,觉得有什么要说的就说什么,如果FANS连这点权力都要剥夺广大非FANS读者的话,那不是对民主反动的法西斯主义(非指现代意义上的)是什么????
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