『漫游』酷论坛>『动漫主题讨论区』>[转贴][怀旧]炮轰日本 ..
lslwyw@2004-05-11 12:40
引用
最初由 oldgoat 发布
不——不要啊，你刚刚钩起我的瘾就跑掉，太不负责了吧？:p :p
停了把，只是吊起你的瘾而已。我都被他轰成“整天无病呻吟的人”了，和平，和平第一
ownfish@2004-05-11 14:24
引用
最初由 cityjim 发布
楼上的，你这长篇大论也能叫骗贴的话那我们还怎么混了......
我的观点就是，侵略没有好坏之分只有胜负之分......没有侵略便没有发展.......所以军国主义也没什么不对的......强权就是真理，公平只是人们想象出来的东西
理性上同意，感情上却想反对（汗……）
堕落@2004-05-11 14:42
引用
最初由 天空的地图 发布
这到底是什么意思？意思是我没有杀人放火的自由吗？那么现在所出现的一切犯罪行为如果不是因为自由而产生的，那是由于什么产生的？
二十年前，我在雅典的一个公园里看见了公海龟强奸雌海龟....
强奸在生理上是可行的，如果我们在自然状态下能获得做任何事的权利，我们就可以简单的认为就像我们有自卫的权利一样我们也有强奸的权利。然而，在我们的社会里我们却禁止这种观念的产生。但是我向每一个相信可以用人的自卫权力来解释我们应该有强奸权力的人进行挑战！
这里给出了答案：我们认为我们有天生做被允许做在人类社会的规则下可以做的任何事的权利。因此，在人类社会的规则下被禁止做的任何事不能成为一种天生的权利，即使这种事从人类自身来说是可行的，或者可以用支持人类天赋人权的相同的言论来辩驳的！
我们都乐意相信，我们的愿望比我们自己更加重要，换句话说，我们想要的就是必要的，我们没有选择，我们天生注定要有所追求。
法律制度的其中一个职责就是对暴力行为进行分析，判断是否存在正当防卫（即有理由的凶杀）。
如果有人拿刀子袭击我，我出于自我保护而捅了他，我将不必为此负任何法律责任。
但是，当牵涉到一个合法化的选择，就是宁愿杀人也不愿意送死，名曰自我防卫，这和我们常常听到的声辩的声音：“我别无选择，不是他死就是我亡！”还是存在着分歧的。
与自然权力一样，人的必然需要也成了辩论者的有力藉口，使他们在辩论还没开始前，就获得了胜利。如果有必要把那个企图拿刀子杀我的人杀死，是不是也有必要杀死或者吃掉救生艇上的幸存者呢？毕竟，若我不这么做的话，死的人将是我，这样说来，就是“不是他死就是我亡”。
堕落@2004-05-11 14:47
引用
最初由 oldgoat 发布
在自由问题上继续骗帖（我也不想的，只是已经构思好了，不写出来不爽）~~
在近代启蒙时期，关于自由的理论基本上与人权、平等、民主等理念同时产生，并经由翻译西方著作传入我国。这几种概念互为因果，相互融合，不过源流都是一个：“天赋人权”理论。
所谓“天赋人权”，就是指人的一切权利都是由天——自然界赋予的，这些权利除了人的自然属性外，没有任何事物能够约束或剥夺。亦或者说，从理论上，在天赋人权的前提下人“原本”就应该拥有除了自然条件外无法约束和剥夺的一切自由。由于这种自由在人死亡之前都能存在，为了行文方便，不妨称之为“绝对自由”。同时，动物与人一样，同样能够拥有这样的自由。
我并不想反驳你
只是才翻译了一篇《天赋人权并不存在》，而且翻译的我要死要活，所以不用心理不舒服
嘿嘿
天赋人权并不存在
By乔纳森•华莱士
我们认为真理是不言而喻的，所有的人类被创造时都是平等的，他们被他们的创造者赐予了一些不能被剥夺的权利，包括生存的权利，追求自由和愉快的权利。
托马斯•杰斐逊在独立宣言里这样写到。我们在学校接受教育的时候也认为这些都是美好的，但是今天我认为这些是虚伪或者懒散的，当然这取决于杰斐逊是否也认识到了这个问题。
如果你和我就此事进行争论的话，我可以答到：“显然我是正确的，”我已经没有必要再补充任何东西了。也许还是我直接说“我宣布我胜利了”来的好。如果杰斐逊——这个能言善辩的伪君子——他并不是有意识的运用辩论者的诡计，而是采用一种非常聪明的捷径，用重复的方式来证明：“因为...是真的，所以它是真的。”
……
这对我来说，是对主张的所谓“权利”一项最危险的基础，如若我们能制定相关禁令，这也意味着我们同样拥有做到任何禁令所限制的事项的能力。
如果我们把权利视为是人类与生俱来的规则手册，而非一纸空文，我们就可以分析那些立法者为调节各种冲突规则而必然所处的环境。例如，每天法院回复诸如此类的问题“是否你的言论自由权高于我的隐私权？”这些问题的配置中，权利是可以二元式转化的，立法者可以轻易地决定其转化的方向。
如果你有为一定行为的权利，那么我就有义务去尊重你的权利而不去干扰它的行使。认为有权权利去阻止他人有权利阻止的事项，这样的说法是不合逻辑的。但是，这却是霍布斯哲学关于自然状态的真实案例。
当你阻挡了我的去路，我就有权杀你，你也有同等的权利来杀我。如果我变得更强大而取得了胜利，对你的家族也有权进行报复，等等……
但是假如严格地按照字面理解，该如何在下文对“权利”进行补充？当我们提及人类的规则手册时，这个问题也就迎刃而解。权利往往可以被定义为，是一项保护你行使特定行为，或者说防止行使权利的过程中受到阻碍的规则。
在霍布斯看来，“权利”一词是不为任何“可以”“能够”所能包涵的内容所剥夺的。试比较以下两种情况：
在霍布斯的天赋人权观点中，我可以杀死你。
在霍布斯的天赋人权观点中，我有权利杀死你。
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I can kill you.
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I have a right to kill you.
一般第二种说法不会有别的意思，除了第一种说法已经有的。但对我来说，好像并非如此。我在别处写下上帝时，常被用作语义停止的符号，意思跟“停止问问题”和“我已经赢了争辩”相似。“权利”这个词也类似。人们经常用到它，在没有可能有别的意思的时候，就像一个小孩在餐桌上愤怒的宣布：“我有权利说话”。
我有一只宠物，是一只名字叫“Chandler”的鹦鹉。它生活在笼子中并且吃的是种子和小球的混合物。我每天让它出笼一个小时。除了“Chandler”吃种子这种说法，难道这会让你认为，我会说：“Chandler有吃种子的一种权利”或者“它有对笼子的权力”或者“它有出笼子的权力”吗？为什么“人们有自我防卫的权力”可以比“人们防卫自己”有更多的意思呢？答案只能是：对我们自己结论的一种重复和预断，也就是关于人类的一种特有的东西，这东西便是：天赋人权（本质上我们想拥有这种东西）。
这就是为什么这种权利的含义不仅有趣而且危险：对我们中的许多人来说，“权利”和一种道德上权威的许可相联系，使我们对它表现出一定的推崇，即使是毫无疑义的境况下。就像一辆汽车，我们不会去买它的权利，直到我们看到它停在车棚下。
在语言表达、事实和逻辑上，阿尔弗雷德•艾尔斯不仅赞成权利这种说法，也赞成在平常交往中，遵从远远比权利赋予我们更少的道德上的因素。
伦理道德的基本概念是无法分析的，因为当他发生时，并没有一个标准可以判断其正确性。他们只是一些假冒的概念。伦理象征的存在也没有什么现实的意义。因此，如果我对某人说：“你偷钱是不对的”，我还不如简单地说：“你偷钱了”。我没有更深入地说明为什么这种行为是不对的，而只是简单地表明自己对此在道德标准上的否定。这与我用一种诧异的口吻说“你偷了钱！”，或者写下来，再加上一串特别的惊叹号，是没有区别的。
……
天赋人权的争论把我们引向了一条错误的道路。与其把精力用在争论我们应当让哪一些规则继续存在下去，还不如把精力用在决定制订哪一些准则。洛克所描述的“完美的自由”是“给他们行动下达指示，卖掉他们财产，当他们看见适合的人…不用请示离开或者依赖任何其它人的意愿”，并没有强制规定权利的存在；而也给我们足够的自由来立法。
我比较喜欢这种自由，它看起来单纯而且清楚：我们其实都在一条船上，决定采用哪个规则，摆脱那些模糊约束，依稀记得的神话故事，匿名的教条式文章和晦暗的自然概念。如果我提出的某些建议你不喜欢，请告诉我为什么它是不实际的，或者伤害了某些人，或者和一些其它有用的规则相抵触；但是别和我说它违反了宇宙规律。
堕落@2004-05-11 14:48
插个嘴而已，我也继续板凳
fifman@2004-05-11 14:51
你们这帮废材……我不想战了的说= =哎，总觉得我们这种小民在这里争论“自由”、“战争”等的话题简直是不自量力。得了，我承认我当时发这一贴的时候无聊到死，我比你们废材……
天空的地图@2004-05-11 15:23
引用
最初由 堕落 发布
二十年前，我在雅典的一个公园里看见了公海龟强奸雌海龟....
强奸在生理上是可行的，如果我们在自然状态下能获得做任何事的权利，我们就可以简单的认为就像我们有自卫的权利一样我们也有强奸的权利。然而，在我们的社会里我们却禁止这种观念的产生。但是我向每一个相信可以用人的自卫权力来解释我们应该有强奸权力的人进行挑战！
这里给出了答案：我们认为我们有天生做被允许做在人类社会的规则下可以做的任何事的权利。因此，在人类社会的规则下被禁止做的任何事不能成为一种天生的权利，即使这种事从人类自身来说是可行的，或者可以用支持人类天赋人权的相同的言论来辩驳的！
我们都乐意相信，我们的愿望比我们自己更加重要，换句话说，我们想要的就是必要的，我们没有选择，我们天生注定要有所追求。
法律制度的其中一个职责就是对暴力行为进行分析，判断是否存在正当防卫（即有理由的凶杀）。
如果有人拿刀子袭击我，我出于自我保护而捅了他，我将不必为此负任何法律责任。
但是，当牵涉到一个合法化的选择，就是宁愿杀人也不愿意送死，名曰自我防卫，这和我们常常听到的声辩的声音：“我别无选择，不是他死就是我亡！”还是存在着分歧的。
与自然权力一样，人的必然需要也成了辩论者的有力藉口，使他们在辩论还没开始前，就获得了胜利。如果有必要把那个企图拿刀子杀我的人杀死，是不是也有必要杀死或者吃掉救生艇上的幸存者呢？毕竟，若我不这么做的话，死的人将是我，这样说来，就是“不是他死就是我亡”。
你怎么知道那个海龟是强奸。。。。。。
法律所形成的权利才是天赋人权，而自然的权利不是天赋人权。是这样的意思吗？
这样的话，我就更糊涂了。不是在讨论自由的问题吗？自由是不是应该只在哲学范畴内讨论呢？
因为即使照你所说，但犯罪依然存在，显然有人在行使并非法律所给予的权利，这类行为你可以说是并非自由的吗？
堕落@2004-05-11 17:26
引用
最初由 天空的地图 发布
你怎么知道那个海龟是强奸。。。。。。
二十年前，我在雅典的一个公园里看见了一件非常奇怪的事，一只公龟遇见了一只母龟。他朝她冲了过去，咬她的脖子和前腿，而那只母龟拼命的想逃脱。不过，最后她还是放弃了，把自己的头和四肢都缩进了壳里，公龟骑在了她身上。五年前（关于这个场面的第一篇文章发表的同一个月）,我站在Galapagos群岛的海滩上看着那些聚集在浅水里的雌海龟。生物学家解释说母海龟在合适的季节里躲到浅水里，因为公海龟只有在深水里才能爬到她们的背上。通常很多种类的母海龟并不能从交配中得到乐趣，所以她们尽量去避免交配。这样，那些公海龟的行为表现为人类的活动就是强奸。
我省略了一段 其实翻译前面都有
哎
我不想争论什么啊 只是引用了一段我翻译了好长时间的论文而已
和这里讨论的主题擦点边罢了
所以借此机会给一些有兴趣的人看看，也算是开拓眼界
虽然我的翻译很烂
但原文其实是很不错的
堕落@2004-05-11 17:31
翻译的论文的观点大致是更本不存在什么所谓的天赋人权，即不是法律给予的权利，也不是自然给予的权利，只是因为人自己想要给自己“拥有”权利一个合理的借口
大致上就这样
不过这个观点在西方有一些学者认同，在中国大陆好象没听说过...
我翻译的水平真的不怎么样
所以真的有兴趣不访看原文....
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, which among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.
So wrote Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. We were taught in school that these words are beautiful, but today I regard them as dishonest or lazy, depending on whether or not Jefferson was aware of the problem with them.
If you and I are arguing about something and I reply, "It is obvious that I am right," I have added nothing to our dialog. I may as well have said, "I declare victory." If Jefferson--so often a golden-tongued hypocrite--was not consciously engaging in a debater's trick, he was taking an intellectual short-cut, using a tautology: "It is true because....it is true."
How can there be "self-evident" rights? Jefferson was writing under a British system which did not recognize the rights that he described, and which was the legal government of the colonies until they succeeded in separating themselves and forming a new one. Had Jefferson written, "We want the following rights," he would have been making a simple, clear statement easy to understand. Language allows us to construct phrases which are grammatically correct but which do not mean anything (or do not mean what they appear to). Does the statement "We hold these rights to be self-evident" in fact mean anything more profound than "we want them?"
Jefferson's and the other framers' views on natural rights were derived from John Locke's highly influential Second Treatise of Government, first published anonymously in 1690. In Chapter 2, "Of the state of nature", Locke describes the "state of nature" in which men exist before forming governments: A state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit, within the bounds of the laws of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man..
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection....
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions....
Permit me an "aha!" Is not this prose exactly the kind Hume was thinking of in his famous condemnation of deriving an "ought" from an "is"?
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulation of propositions is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason ought to be given for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others which are entirely different from it.
Now note what Locke did: In the state of nature, "all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal" and therefore all men "should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection...."
And he does it again: "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it" which teaches that "no one ought to harm another".
Locke's view of the state of nature is more placid than that of Thomas Hobbes, who believed that all men begin in a state of war of "every man, against every man." Locke by contrast could imagine men living together "according to reason", that is, peacefully, "but without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them" (Chapter 3, "Of the state of war").
OK, let us watch Hobbes conjugate “An Ought From An Is”.
To this ware of every man against every man, this also is consequent, that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have there no place.
Seeming to say that there are no natural rights, just a state of chaos before government. In the state of nature, "Force and Fraud" are the two cardinal virtues; "there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thin distinct."
But then we make the rough transition to Chapter 14, "Of the first and second Natural Law’s, and of Contracts":
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Natural, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgment, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereto.
"Rights" language, as these two philosophers illustrate, is among the trickiest of human concepts: it is an area in which we all think we know what we are talking about when in reality we have no idea. Hobbes starts by saying that in a state of nature, there is no Justice, no property, etc., therefore no possible founding of "rights"; but in his next chapter he appears to say that without human rulebooks (criminal laws, laws of property) we each should have the right to do whatever preserves our life and our enjoyment.
Hobbes (and many others) seems to me to confound three concepts: what we physically can do; what we desire, which may be different; and what we ought to do, which again may be entirely distinct from the first two categories.
Looked at this way, Locke and Hobbes commit very different versions of Hume's fallacy. Locke reverse engineers the way things are from the way he believes they ought to be: people should be peaceful and respectful of one another, and therefore are this way in a state of nature, which exists only because they lack a common judge. Hobbes goes in the other direction and elevates the way he believes things are (nasty and brutish, constant war of all against all) to a moral imperative, that we (ought to) have a right of mutual destruction until we adopt rules which say otherwise.
What we physically can do
This seems to me to be the single most dangerous foundation for a claimed "right", as we have the physical ability to do all the things we make rules against (there would be no point in banning them if we couldn't do them.)
If we regard rights as a human-generated rulebook, not engraven in the fabric of the universe, we can analyze many circumstances in which the rule-makers must mediate between conflicting interpretations. For example, our courts answer questions like the following every day: Does your right of free speech trump my right of privacy? In this scheme of things, rights are a binary switch, and the rule-makers simply decide which way to set the switch. If you have a right to do something, I have an obligation to respect it and not to interfere with it. It would be illogical to say you have a "right" to do something which I have a "right" to prevent.
But this is exactly the case in the Hobbesian state of nature. I have a "right" to kill you if you get in my way, but you have an equal "right" to kill me. If I am stronger and I succeed, your family nonetheless has a "right" to take revenge, and so forth. ("An eye for an eye," said Gandhi, "makes the whole world blind.")
But if we think strictly in terms of language, what do we add by speaking of "rights" in this context? When we are speaking of human rulebooks, it is much easier to answer that question. A right can be defined as a rule which protects you in taking an action and prevents me from interfering with it.
But in a Hobbesian state of nature, the word "right" seems to be stripped of any content not already contained in the word "can". Compare these two statements:
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I can kill you.
In a Hobbesian state of nature, I have a right to kill you.
There is no meaning communicated by the second statement not already contained in the first. But there appears to be. I have written elsewhere that the word God is often used as a semantic stop sign, meaning simultaneously "Stop asking questions" and "I have won this argument." The word "right" is used similarly. People frequently use it in a context where it has no other possible meaning, like a child at the dinner table proclaiming angrily "I have a right to speak!"
I have a pet cockatiel named Chandler, who lives in a cage and eats a seed and pellet mixture. I let him out of his cage for about an hour a day. Does it make any sense to you, if instead of saying that Chandler eats seeds, I say "Chandler has a right to seeds"? Does he have a "right" to his cage, or to be let out of it? If "Chandler has a right to seeds" has no more meaning than the statement "Chandler eats seeds", why does "man has a right to self defense" mean anything more than "men defend themselves"? The answer can only be in a tautology, a prejudgment of our conclusion: that there is something special about man which dictates that natural rights exist (essentially because we want them to.)
This is why rights language is not only fuzzy but dangerous; for many of us the word "rights" communicates an imprimatur of moral authority, causing us to behave respectfully even in contexts where it is completely meaningless. Like an automobile, we should never buy a right until we have looked beneath the hood.
In Language, Truth and Logic, Alfred Ayers concurs that not only rights language but that of morality in general communicates far less than it purports to:
Fundamental ethical conceptions are unanalyzable, inasmuch as there is no criterion by which one can test the validity of the judgments in which they occur...They are mere pseudo concepts. The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a particular tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks.
In a debate with gun rights people year before last, I rapidly discovered that they all believed that the right to bear arms was a natural right, engraved in the fabric of the universe, and merely affirmed, not created by their beloved Second Amendment. For these people, Locke and Hobbes are living philosophers (and more particularly Hobbes, I think.)
The concept of natural rights was used by many of my gun rights correspondents both as a club and a credit card on which to charge up selfishness. Club: "I have a natural right to self defense, so therefore I win this argument," was the gist of many of the messages I received. Credit card: When I proposed that we sit at a table together to make a rulebook about guns, accommodating the interests of those who do not want them along with those who do, many people responded: "My natural right to bear arms trumps your desire not to have guns around. Therefore there is no basis for discussion."
You hear in such debates not only that it is "natural" for us to defend ourselves but that animals are equipped with claws, horns and teeth to do so. Somehow this fact, that people and other animals defend themselves when endangered, is extrapolated into a "right."
Twenty years ago, I watched fascinated in a park in Athens as a male tortoise encountered a female. He rushed at her, biting at her neck and forelegs, while she desperately tried to escape. Finally, she gave up and withdrew her head and limbs into her shell, and he mounted her from behind. Five years ago (the month the first issue of the Spectacle was published) I stood on a beach in the Galapagos and watched female sea turtles congregating in the shallow water. A biologist explained that the females enter the shallow water during mating season to escape the males who are unable to force themselves on them if the water is not deep enough. It seems general that in many turtle species the females derive no pleasure from copulation and do everything they can to avoid it. The actions of the males if performed by humans would be characterized as rape.
Rape is physically possible; if we derive natural rights from anything which can be done in a state of nature we could just as easily say there is a right of rape as to claim there is one of self-defense. Yet in our society we lock up anyone who acts on this belief. But I challenge anyone who believes there is a natural right of self defense to explain to me why there is no right of rape.
Here is the answer: We believe there is a natural right to do anything which we think should be permitted (or mandated) under a human rulebook. Anything which should be forbidden under a human rulebook therefore cannot be a natural right, even if it is physically possible and can be justified by the same arguments used to support the idea of natural rights.
What we desire
This is just another way of saying that we like to believe that our desires are greater than ourselves; that what we want is necessary, that there is no choice, that the universe has dictated that we must pursue it.
One of the functions of our legal system is to analyze acts of violence to determine whether they involved acceptable acts of self defense ("justifiable homicide"). If a man attacks me with a knife and I shoot him in reasonable fear of my life, I will not be held legally responsible. But there is a chasm between the reality of self-defense, which involves a legally acceptable choice to kill rather than die, and the familiar statement, "I had no choice. It was him or me."
Like natural rights, the concept of necessity is used as a debaters' trick, to win arguments before they have begun. If it was "necessary" to kill the man who attacked me with the knife, is it similarly "necessary" for me to kill and eat the other denizen of a lifeboat? After all, if I do not, I will die, so in that sense it is either "him or me".
Note the similarity to the natural rights discussion? In a state of nature, I can kill and eat the other passenger; I want to, because I desire to survive; and therefore I should have a "natural right" to do so.
What we ought to do
While deriving "rights" from physically possible acts or our own desires shortcuts moral debate and human freedom, projecting our own rulebooks onto the universe is equally insidious (and usually more subtly expressed than the crude language used by proponents of these other beliefs.)
Let’s look at Locke again:
Reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions....
While I would not allow Hobbes to guide me down a blind alley, because of my distrust of his ideas, Locke could easily get me in all kinds of trouble, because he wants what I want: peace among humans. But he has committed the same fallacy as the more brutal Hobbes. A Hobbesian says, I want your property, therefore I have a right to it; but a Locke says I want peace; therefore we all have a right to it.
The theme of three thousand years of human moral discourse has been the attempt to plant moral rules on some firmer foundation than our own freedom. God, Jesus, Platonic forms, pure reason, categorical imperatives, and genetic rewards for altruism, all come to the same thing: the fear and loneliness inspired by human freedom.
One of the more interesting things you learn about in law school is the evolution of human custom into law. Codes based on custom and practice, like the Uniform Commercial Code, tend to sparkle with common sense, and are easy to apply. I ship you goods "freight on board": they are my legal responsibility until they are on board your ship. I send them "cost, insurance, freight": they are your responsibility from the moment I accept your order.
Now imagine the spectacle of an assembly of businessmen and lawyers, tasked with creating a uniform commercial code, trying to derive their rules from the behavior of lions or bears or of humans in a state of nature. Even if they were trying to base their legislation on the old and new Testaments they would find these "precedents" to be of partial help, and rather contradictory. Instead, we all acknowledge that the act of legislating is (and should be) an exercise of determining the rules we want and which make sense from a practical standpoint.
Next, imagine the even stranger spectacle of this assembly weeping and wailing, and abandoning its work, because it has determined that there is no natural rule-set, engraved in the universe's fabric, to determine who has the responsibility for freight which is destroyed between the warehouse and the boat.
Freedom
The natural rights debate leads us down a false road. The energy spent in arguing which rules exist should better be spent deciding which rules we should make. The "perfect freedom" Locke described "to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit... without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man", does not dictate the existence of rights; instead it leaves us perfectly free to legislate them.
I prefer this freedom, which seems to me simple and clear: we are all at a table together, deciding which rules to adopt, free from any vague constraints, half-remembered myths, anonymous patriarchal texts and murky concepts of nature. If I propose something you do not like, tell me why it is not practical, or harms somebody, or is counter to some other useful rule; but don't tell me it offends the universe.
Yeats said:
Locke fell into a swoon;
The Garden died;
God took the spinning jenny out of His side.
cityjim@2004-05-11 17:35
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天空的地图@2004-05-11 17:43
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最初由 堕落 发布
二十年前，我在雅典的一个公园里看见了一件非常奇怪的事，一只公龟遇见了一只母龟。他朝她冲了过去，咬她的脖子和前腿，而那只母龟拼命的想逃脱。不过，最后她还是放弃了，把自己的头和四肢都缩进了壳里，公龟骑在了她身上。五年前（关于这个场面的第一篇文章发表的同一个月）,我站在Galapagos群岛的海滩上看着那些聚集在浅水里的雌海龟。生物学家解释说母海龟在合适的季节里躲到浅水里，因为公海龟只有在深水里才能爬到她们的背上。通常很多种类的母海龟并不能从交配中得到乐趣，所以她们尽量去避免交配。这样，那些公海龟的行为表现为人类的活动就是强奸。
我省略了一段 其实翻译前面都有
哎
我不想争论什么啊 只是引用了一段我翻译了好长时间的论文而已
和这里讨论的主题擦点边罢了
所以借此机会给一些有兴趣的人看看，也算是开拓眼界
虽然我的翻译很烂
但原文其实是很不错的
不。。。。我是说海龟会有伦理的观念吗？。。。。
大概明白了你的意思，也对，是有点这个意思
paulph@2004-05-11 17:43
引用
最初由 lslwyw 发布
这观点简直和我以前提到的一模一样。。。。。当时漫游可是有些自认正义象征的人要轰的我体无完肤呀:p
如果那些自认为“众人皆醉我独醒”的家伙再说这种废话，我会毫不犹豫地再轰下去:o
跟那些认为纳粹无罪、强权就是真理的人说和平根本就是浪费时间
paulph@2004-05-11 17:54
引用
最初由 cityjim 发布
没办法，爱与和平才是论坛的主流啊.......和平，和平.......
谁把人类想的太简单的大家都有自己的想法，为了和平今天就不争了......
PS：我怎么看历史怎么都像在告诉我“没有侵略便没有发展”.......你要是不“侵略”别的生物就能长的这么大？
那你就举出例子来，照你的说法联合国宪章和独立宣言都是废的，虚伪且无意义的。老祖宗的那句“水能覆舟也能载舟”也是切头切尾的谎言。
当然如果你假定有人能够有能力让全部人永远闭嘴当他的奴隶那我就不浪费时间了
cityjim@2004-05-11 18:06
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paulph@2004-05-11 18:09
引用
最初由 cityjim 发布
你完全没明白我的意思......到此为止吧，和平，和平
那你就说明白给我听听:o
既然强权就是真理，还谈什么和平。表现一下你的强权啊，既然你认为自己是对的
这年头，说纳粹无罪的叫自己是和平主义者，认为强权就是真理的大叫热爱和平，真不知道是我火星还是我在火星上
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